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Résumé / Abstract 
 
On étudie les effets de la découverte des stocks de ressources sur les profits des firmes 
asymétriques. On montre que l’augmentation uniforme des stocks pour toutes les firmes 
pourrait désavantager celles qui sont initialement les plus grandes. On déduit que la 
découverte d’une nouvelle technologie qui permet une augmentation d’efficacité d’extraction 
pour toutes les firmes pourrait réduire le profit de certaines firmes. 
 






We investigate the effect of stock discovery on the profits of non-identical oligopolists. We 
show that a uniform addition to all stocks could harm firms that are originally larger than 
average. One conclusion that could be drawn from the results is that a new technology that 
leads to more efficient exploitation of the available resource is not necessarily welcomed by 
all firms. 
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1. Introduction
Resource-extracting oligopolists continually engage in the search
for additional stocks or in ﬁnding new technologies to transform re-
sources that are economically non-exploitable into resources that can
be proﬁtably extracted. If the demand curve facing the industry is
elastic, the discovery of additional stocks will raise the industry’s
proﬁt. It is not clear, however, if all ﬁrms will beneﬁt from a windfall
“gain” (discovery) that increases the stock of each ﬁrm.
In this note, we consider oligopolistic equilibria in subgame-perfect
strategies in continuous time1, and investigate the eﬀect of stock dis-
covery on the proﬁts of non-identical oligopolists. We show that a
uniform addition to all stocks could harm ﬁrms that are originally
larger than average.
In a static model, this result is not surprising. Starting from a
Cournot equilibrium it is well known that a marginal reduction of all
ﬁrms production will be beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms and will move them
closer to the cooperative equilibrium. Conversely, increasing the out-
put of all ﬁrms is likely to move them further from the cooperative
outcome and will reduce their proﬁts. In a dynamic framework with
free time horizon, this reasoning is not necessarily valid. The typical
extraction path under non-cooperation is monotonically decreasing
over time with production level below the production level of coop-
erative exploitation for at least some interval of time, which we refer
to as a scarcity phase2.W h e n a ﬁrm receives an additional stock it
splits its extra-exploitation between the scarcity phase and the phase
where production is above the cooperative level. Increasing exploita-
1Existing models of natural resource oligopoly that use the concept of Markov
perfect Nash equilibria are typically based on the assumption that there is only one
stock,t ow h i c ha l lﬁrms have equal common access. See, for instance, Benchekroun
(2003), Benchekroun and Long (2002), Dockner and Sorger (1996), Benhabib and
Radner (1992). Our model has N stocks, and we rule out common access.
2See for example Dasgupta and Heal (1979) chapter 11, where the extraction
path of a nonrenewable resource under monopoly is compared to the extraction
path under perfect competition.2
tion during the latter phase decreases instantaneous proﬁts whereas
increasing exploitation during scarcity phase increases instantaneous
proﬁts. The overall impact of increasing stocks on the discounted sum
of proﬁts of each ﬁr mi st h e r e f o r eu n c l e a r .T h i si sw h a tt h i sn o t es e e k s
to clarify.
2. The Model
2.1. Assumptions and notations
We consider an oligopoly exploiting a non-renewable resource. There
are N ﬁrms. Firm i owns a stock of resource Xi (t) with Xi (0) = X0
i .




Xi(t),a n dl e t  X (t)=( X1 (t),...,XN (t)) denote the vector
of resource stocks available at time t.D e ﬁne X−i(t) ≡ X(t) − Xi(t).
Without loss of generality ﬁrms are ranked in an increasing order
of their stocks, with ﬁrm 1 being the smallest ﬁrm: X0
1 ≤ .. ≤ X0
i .. ≤
X0
N. T h er a t eo fe x t r a c t i o no fﬁrm i at time t is denoted by qi (t).I n
the absence of new discoveries, the rate of change of ﬁrm i’s resource
stock is:
˙ Xi(t)=−qi(t)




where 0 <α≤ 1 and Q(t)=
N X
i=1
qi (t). The industry’s elasticity of
demand is 1/α ≥ 1.
Let Q−i ≡ Q − qi, ﬁrm i’s revenue is
Ri(qi,Q −i)=qi(qi + Q−i)
−α3
Assume the cost of extraction is zero. The objective function of







˙ Xi(t)=−qi(t) with Xi (0) = X
0
i .
2.2. A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
Let φi denote an extraction strategy that speciﬁes ﬁrm i’s extrac-
tion rate at time t as a function of t and of the vector of resource
stocks available at time t:
qi (t)=φi
³
t,   X (t)
´
.
Each ﬁrm i takes its competitor’ strategies as given and determines
its optimal strategy φi that maximizes (1).
Proposition 1: There exists a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium,
where the equilibrium strategy of ﬁrm i has the property that its
extraction rate depends only on its own stock:
qi =( r/α)Xi ,w h e r ei =1 ,..,N.
The discounted sum of proﬁts of ﬁrm i when the vector of resource
stock is   X is then










It is interesting to note that, from (2),
∂Vi
∂Xi > 0: ﬁrm i’s valuation
of a marginal additional unit of resource stock
∂Vi
∂Xi is higher the smaller




. Moreover, from (2),t h el a r g e rﬁrm




, the more harmful is an additional
unit of resource in the competitors’ total available stock (the higher
the absolute value of
∂Vi
∂Xj).4
2.3. A marginal change in the resource endowment
The value function for ﬁrm i, Vi,i sg i v e nb y(2).T o t a ld i ﬀerenti-
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(3)
We now consider the impact of a potential windfall of resources in the







and where dXj corresponds to the change in
the resource stock owned by ﬁrm j.
Proposition 2: A change in the initial vector of resource stocks






Proof: Follows immediately from (3).
Proposition 2 implies that even when dXi > 0, ﬁrm i can see its
discounted sum of proﬁts fall. This surprising outcome emerges even5
i nt h es p e c i a lc a s ew h e r ew eh a v eau n i f o r m( a b s o l u t e )w i n d f a l lo f
resources (i.e. dXk = δ for all k).
Corollary 1: A uniform absolute increase in all stocks by δ>0








Remark 1: This implies that if the initial resource stocks are such
that there exists M ≤ N such
XM
X > 1
αN then a uniform windfall gain
of all ﬁrms’ resource stocks by an identical amount δ will result in a
decrease in the discounted sum of proﬁts of ﬁrm i for all i ≥ M.T h e
ﬁrms with the largest stocks could be harmed by this uniform gain in
the stocks across ﬁrms. Note that the impact on ﬁrm i0s discounted
sum of proﬁts depends only on its relative resource stock, i.e. the
impact on ﬁrm i does not depend on how the change in the stocks is
distributed among its competitors. In particular ﬁrm i does not care
about whether the changes in stocks occur mainly for competitors with
bigger (or smaller) stocks.




N for all i =1 ,..,N and therefore any increase
in all ﬁrms’ resource stocks by a constant amount will increase each
ﬁrm’s discounted sum of proﬁts, if 0 <α<1.
Remark 3: Consider a proportional windfall gain of all ﬁrm’s












An increase in the stocks in this case will always result in an increase
in the present value of proﬁt ﬂow of each ﬁrm if 0 <α<1.
Remark 4: It can be checked, in the case 0 <α<1,t h a tt h e
total industry’s proﬁts will increase if and only if dX > 0. A decrease6
in the total resource stock available will unambiguously result in a
decrease of the industry’s proﬁts.
Proposition 2 can be reinterpreted as follows: a global increase of
all ﬁrms’ stocks (dX > 0) will result in an increase of ﬁrm i’s proﬁts







A condition for the increase of all ﬁrms’ proﬁts: a global increase of
all ﬁrms’ stocks (dX > 0) will result in an increase of all ﬁrms proﬁts






for all i. (4)
Corollary 2: In the limit case where α =1 , (i) no increase in
stocks that modiﬁes the relative distribution of the resource stocks
can increase all ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and (ii) any increase in stocks that
leaves the relative endowments of the resource unchanged will have no
impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts.




X > 0 for all i which is impossible. Indeed
dXi
Xi > dX






















dXi = dX and
N X
i=1
Xi = X this condition would imply that
dX > dX.
From the condition (4) we can note that the smaller α the larger
the set of possible increase in resource endowments that result in an
increase of all ﬁrms’ proﬁts. In the following section, we extend our
results to the case of non-marginal changes in ﬁrms’ stocks.7
2.4. A non-marginal change in the resource endowment
Let Yi denote the stock of resource owned by ﬁrm i (instead of Xi).
We assume
Yi >X i for all i =1 ,..,N
i.e. we consider a new allocation of the resource where each ﬁrm owns
more stock than initially.
The value function of ﬁrm i with the new resource allocation is
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−1 denote respectively the percentage
change in the resource endowment for ﬁrm i and for the whole industry.
T h er e a l l o c a t i o no fr e s o u r c ee n d o w m e n t si su n p r o ﬁtable for ﬁrm i iﬀ
τi < (1 + ¯ τ)
α − 1 (5)8
Again, in the limit case where α =1 ,i ti si m p o s s i b l et oh a v e
τi > (1 + ¯ τ)
α − 1 > 0 for all i =1 ,..,N
The condition (5) can be interpreted as follows. Assume there is a




) to be distributed amongst
the N ﬁrms (where each ﬁrm i initially owns Xi), then each ﬁrm i
should be allocated at least a stock
Yi = ((1 + ¯ τ)
α − 1)Xi
for the proﬁts of ﬁrm i not to fall.
An alternative use of condition (5) is to determine conditions on
the initial distribution of the resource   X that will make a uniform
increase in all ﬁrms’ stocks by δ increase all ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We seek a
condition on the initial stock of ﬁrm i, Xi, such that:




(1 + ¯ τ)
α >X i.
Proﬁtability for all ﬁrms requires
Xi <
(1 + ¯ τ)
α
δ
for all i =1 ,..,N
where ¯ τ = Nδ
¯ X .Suppose a constant amount of stock, δ,i st ob eg r a n t e d
to all ﬁrms. For this to increase the proﬁts of all ﬁr m sw em u s th a v e
δ>M a x i {(1 + ¯ τ)
α Xi}.
3. Concluding remarks
One conclusion that could be drawn from the results above is that
a new technology that allows for a more eﬃcient exploitation of the9
available resource is not necessarily welcomed by all ﬁrms. In particu-
lar, consider a joint venture in an R&D project to obtain a technology
improvement that results in an increase of the stock of exploitable
resource available to each ﬁrm. The results of this paper determine
the conditions on the new resource allocation that will prevail, under
which such a project will draw the participation of the whole industry.
Our results also have some political economy implications. Suppose a
government decides to authorize exploitation in a geographically area
that was initially "protected" (e.g. Alaska and oil exploitation). The
results presented in this paper determine conditions that guarantee
that the resource allocation resulting from such a policy is proﬁtable
to all ﬁrms.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
We need to check that if qj =( r/α)Xj for j 6= i,j =1 ,..,N then
ﬁrm i’s best reply will be qi =( r/α)Xi . To verify this claim, we must
ﬁnd a value function Vi(   X) such that the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation (HJB eq.) is satisﬁed by the extraction strategy
qi =( r/α)Xi :



























We conjecture that the value function is































−α−1 < 0 for j 6= i.( 1 0 )





We must check that, after the substitution of (9), (10) and (11) into
the right-hand side of the HJB equation, and the value function con-
jectured in (8) into the left-hand side of the HJB equation (6), we do
get an identity.12



















































which is identical to the left-hand side, rVi(   X), of the HJB equation.